community or guardianship regimes of the 1983 Act.
11 It comprises of two tests: the ineligible status test 12 and the ineligible objection test. 13 If both are satisfied, the person cannot be subject to DoLS.
In relation to the first test, Charles J. held that someone was "within the scope" of the 1983 Act if, This first test could prove decisive: it could rule out the possibility of detention under the 1983 Act.
A learning disability which is not associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct, for example, would be "within the ambit of the MCA but not of the MHA 1983". 16 But the latter had "primacy" whenever it applied. Although the two forms of detention were not always mutually exclusive, it was unlawful for anyone "to proceed on the basis that they can pick and choose between the two statutory regimes as they think fit". 17 In areas of doubt, they must "take all practical steps to ensure that that primacy is recognised and given effect to."
18
If the detention criteria of the 1983 Act were met, the decision maker must go on to determine the ineligible status test which is to be found in Schedule 1A paragraph 5. It consists of three conditions. First, the instrument authorising detention must authorise the person to be a "mental health patient". Second, the person must object either to having that status or to mental health treatment.
Third, a donee or deputy must not make a valid decision to consent to the relevant objection. In the present case, the first condition was decisive.
A "mental health patient" was defined as someone accommodated in a "hospital" 19 for the "purpose" of being given "medical treatment for mental disorder". 20 Mr J was clearly accommodated in hospital but the purpose was unclear. Charles J. held that eligibility assessors must first identify 14 Ibid. agitated, punching his temples. He never attempted to leave but remained disturbed for most of his stay on the locked unit. 37 So distressed was his behaviour that sedative medication had to be administered to manage it. He also refused a CT scan and EEG.
Having regard to all the reasonably ascertainable circumstances, including his present and, if appropriate, past behaviour, wishes, views, beliefs and values, was Mr L not objecting? 38 Should he not at least have been assumed to be objecting on the basis that he would have objected had he been able? If so, the stark position is that DoLS could not be used in the very situation for which they were designed. He would have been an ineligible, objecting mental health patient whose detention could only have been authorised by the 1983 Act.
CONCLUSIONS
History will judge whether Schedules A1 and 1A of the 2005 Act have managed to plug the colloquial "Bournewood gap". To some extent they take a belt and braces approach by prescribing a procedure to deprive liberty in circumstances that go beyond the facts of Bournewood. Safeguards have thus been afforded to those requiring care home detention and hospital detention for physical ill health. Both remain unaffected by Case E because they cannot be mental health patients. 39 Protective detention occurring in other settings, like supported housing, have been left to the Court of Protection to sanction. 40 
